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Abstract:  We examine how well several institutional and firm-level factors explain firms’ 
perceptions of property rights protection. Our sample includes private and public firms which 
vary in size from very small to large in 80 countries. Together, the institutional theories we 
investigate account for approximately 50 percent of the country-level variation, indicating that the 
literature is addressing first-order factors. Firm-level characteristics, such as legal organization 
and ownership structure, are comparable to institutional factors in explaining variation in property 
rights protection. A country’s legal origin predicts property rights variation better than its 
religion, its ethnic diversity, or natural endowments. However, these results are driven by the 
inclusion of former Socialist economies in the sample. When we exclude the former Socialist 
economies, legal origin explains considerably less than ethnic fractionalization. 
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In modern corporate finance, it is taken as axiomatic that the firm is a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Many of the predictions of corporate theory 
depend at some level on how well protected property rights assigned by these contracts 
really are. People may be less willing to invest and more willing to engage in 
opportunistic behavior if property rights are insecure. Several serious theories have 
recently been advanced to explain the underlying determinants of property rights across 
countries.  The seminal Law and Finance theory (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (henceforth LLSV) (1998)) stressed the importance of legal traditions. Other 
influential work has taken a broader view, stressing Culture (Stulz and Williamson 
(2003)), Ethnic diversity (Alesina et al. (2003) and Easterly and Levine (1997)), and 
Endowments (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). 
While all seem to contain elements of truth, it is important to distinguish which 
theories are relatively more important. In this paper we study the perceptions of business 
people in different countries regarding how well protected their property rights really are 
in practice. By matching these perceptions with country level and firm level factors we 
are able to assess the relative importance of each of these theories. Using a variance 
decomposition approach, we examine differences between countries as well as 
differences between firms.  
We find that, in our full sample, the law and finance theory appears to do well in 
explaining firms’ perceptions of property rights. However, this result is critically 
dependent on how we treat the former Socialist countries. If we pool them with the rest, 
then legal origin alone explains about 22% of the variation in firms’ perception of 
property rights protection that is attributable to country-level effects. The theories based 
on a country’s endowments (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)) and ethnic 
fractionalization (Alesina et al. (2003), Easterly and Levine (1997)) while not as strong, 
also do well.  
If we argue that the former Socialist countries need to be handled separately, then 
the explanatory power of legal origin decreases dramatically. Legal Origin explains only 
13% of the variation in property rights protection at the country level. Instead, a country’s 
ethnic fractionalization when entered individually, explains 28% of the variation in the   3
reduced sample indicating support for the ethnic fractionalization view. Thus, we find 
that the strong performance of the Law and Finance view is not due to differences in the 
way common law and civil law treat investor rights, but depends on the inclusion of 
countries with Socialist legal tradition in the sample. However, the institutions in these 
countries have much more than legal tradition in common. Thus, including these 
countries in a sample testing the Law and Finance view ascribes too much to shared legal 
origin. We also note that the original papers detailing the importance of legal origin for 
financial development, LLSV (1998, 1999b) did not include any countries with Socialist 
legal tradition.  
As robustness tests we also include what we consider to be partially endogenous 
theories - openness to trade and the political variables, democracy, autocracy and checks 
and balances. While Legal origin dominates in terms of explanatory power over most of 
these variables, except democracy, in the full sample, once we remove transition 
economies, all the partially endogenous variables explain more of the variation in 
property rights protection than legal origin.  
While the total overall variation in property rights explained at the country level 
by country dummies is low (17.82%), the institutional variables when entered together 
account for nearly 50% of this country-level variation in the full sample, and 52% of the 
country level variation in the sample without the former Socialist countries. Thus, the 
current debate about the country-level institutional factors that affect property rights is 
addressing important first order effects that significantly influence firms’ perceptions of 
property rights. In fact, in a reduced sub-sample of 40 countries for which data on settler 
mortality is available, the various institutional theories together explain 62% of the 
variation at the country level. 
We also find that firm-level characteristics have substantial explanatory power in 
our sample, in some cases even exceeding that of the individual country-level 
institutional factors. For the full sample, the ownership structure of the firm has the 
highest explanatory power, nearly 8.5% of that of the country dummies, followed by size   4
and organizational form.
1 However, once we drop the former Socialist countries, 
organizational form becomes the most important firm-level explanatory variable. 
In comparing the different institutional theories, we exploit the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-sectional survey conducted in developed 
and developing countries in 1999 and led by the World Bank. We use survey responses 
from 7760 firms in 80 countries to questions about property rights and firm 
characteristics. The survey contains data on small as well as large firms, and on private 
corporations and partnerships as well as publicly traded firms.
2 
In order to compare the different theories and to examine the relative influence of 
firm effects versus country effects, we use variance decomposition analysis. This 
methodology is well established in the corporate strategy literature in the context of 
decomposing profitability into corporate and industry effects (Schmalensee, 1985; 
Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
3 The 
methodology allows us to focus directly on the general importance of these effects in 
explaining property rights without any assumptions on causality or structural analysis. 
Our analysis also uncovers a methodological issue that has not received adequate 
attention in the literature. The explanatory power of several institutional theories depends 
on the proxies used to represent these theories. We identify several potentially significant 
scaling issues that occur if empirical tests do not pay attention to non-linearities arising 
due to the way the proxies are scaled. These scaling issues have the potential to overturn 
conclusions drawn from tests. 
This paper is closely related to the recent work of Stulz, Karolyi, and Doidge 
(2004) who investigate variation in the ratings of governance in large firms in a large 
sample of countries. They find that most of the variation in governance ratings across 
firms is explained by country characteristics rather than firm characteristics. They 
attribute this finding to the increased incentives of firms in better legal environments to 
adopt better governance structures.   
                                                 
1 Firms can be organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, private corporations or 
publicly traded corporations. 
2 The WBES has been used by Love and Mylenko (2003), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2003), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005), 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2005) among others. 
3 The original application of this methodology was in quantitative genetics to decompose variation in traits 
into a genetic component and an environment component (Jinks and Fulker (1970)).   5
In their paper on the determinants of financial system and stock market 
development, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) also discuss property rights 
protection. Our methodology and findings differ from theirs in several respects. First, 
while we use firm-level data on property rights protection, they use a country-level index, 
compiled by the Heritage Foundation from several private and public sources, and cannot 
address the issue of whether firm characteristics affect property rights protection.   
Second, while we consider each institutional theory separately and treat all of them 
equally, Beck et al (2003) focus on legal origin and settler mortality and use the proxies 
for other theories simply as control variables.  Finally, their sample of 70 countries does 
not include any of the former Socialist countries that are in our sample. These factors are 
likely to explain why we find a clear difference in the explanatory power of the legal 
origin and endowment views for property rights protection and for several related 
variables, and their paper does not. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the various 
institutional determinants of property rights that we investigate in this paper. Section 3 
presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the data and the results of the 
variance decomposition analysis. Section 5 presents additional robustness tests and we 
conclude with suggestions for future research in section 6. 
 
 
2. Institutional Determinants of Property Rights Protection 
  In order to understand better the determinants of  firm’s perceptions of property 
rights protection, we present a one-to-one comparison of four different institutional 
theories that have been shown by current literature as being important predictors of 
property rights - Legal Origin, Endowments, Culture and Ethnic Fractionalization.  
LLSV (1998) argue that legal systems differ in how much they protect the rights 
of private investors vis-à-vis the state and minority shareholders. They argue that legal 
systems that evolved from common law traditions have tended to be supportive of private 
property rights. By contrast, civil law systems were established by states as acts of policy. 
They tend to be designed to state administration, are more predictable, and are less likely 
to favor individuals over the state or to tailor decisions in ways that safeguard individual   6
claimants in specific instances. The LLSV theory focuses on the differences between five 
influential legal traditions: the British common law, the French civil law, the German 
civil law, the Scandinavian civil law and the Socialist law countries. To identify the legal 
origin of the country, we use five different dummy variables to capture each type of legal 
system using data from LLSV (1998, 1999). We refer to the effect of legal origin on 
property rights as the Law and Finance view.  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (henceforth AJR) argue that in many 
countries, especially former colonies, the legal system was not designed to protect 
property rights. Instead, its purpose was to facilitate the extraction of resources from the 
indigenous population. Thus, two systems with the same legal origin may in practice 
offer very different protections.  AJR (2001, 2002) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) 
contend that European colonization offers a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. 
Europeans set up extractive systems in colonies which were not attractive for colonial 
settlement because of high settler mortality due to natural causes at the time of 
colonization or because the indigenous population was relatively large. In colonies where 
settlement was feasible the judicial systems were set up so as to protect the property 
rights of the settlers. This theory emphasizes the role of geography (latitude and natural 
endowments) and disease environment (which affected the settler mortality) in shaping 
property rights. We refer to this theory as the Endowment view.  
To measure geographical endowments, we use Latitude, which is the absolute 
value of the latitude of the country scaled between 0 and 1, from LLSV (1999). Countries 
closer to the equator tend to have a more tropical climate that was inhospitable to 
European settlers and therefore fostered “extractive” institutions. We use data on Settler 
Mortality from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) where settler mortality is a 
measure of the death rates faced by European settlers in former colonies and is calculated 
by the logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand Europeans. Since we have data on 
settler mortality for a smaller sample, we use latitude for our main results and present the 
results on settler mortality as a robustness test
4. 
                                                 
4 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) note that a second channel through which geographical endowments 
shape initial institutions is through openness and competition. They show that agriculture in southern North 
America and much of South America is conducive to large plantations. Thus, colonialists developed long-
lasting institutions to protect the few landowners against the many peasants. In contrast, northern North   7
  Several researchers have argued that the effect of the legal system per se on 
property rights is limited, and that differences across countries in their enforcement 
depends on a broader range of cultural and social considerations. Thus, according to the 
Culture view, differences in culture, defined as a system of beliefs, can help explain the 
differences in investor protection. Stulz and Williamson (2003) and LLSV (1999) both 
use religion as a proxy for culture. We use four categories of classification for the 
religion variable: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Other Religions. The data on religious 
composition is taken from LLSV (1999) to create four corresponding dummy variables, 
each of which takes the value 1 if the religion it represents is the dominant religious 
group (highest percentage of practicing population) in the country and 0 otherwise
5.     
  Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity is also an important 
determinant of rent seeking and social polarization, affecting property rights and social 
institutions.
6 We term this the Ethnic Diversity view. Empirically, to capture these 
broader ethnic diversity effects we use a measure of ethnic fractionalization of the 
country compiled by Alesina et al (2003). Unlike measures used in the earlier literature, 
this measure captures important aspects of ethnicity like racial origin and skin color.
7  
  The explanatory power of the different variables may be affected due to non-
linearities arising from the way these variables are constructed. Unlike legal origin, the 
other theories posit determinants of property rights that cannot be directly observed. 
These determinants are accordingly proxied by variables that have been independently 
scaled for other purposes. Conventionally, these proxies are then entered linearly in an 
equation that predicts a variable of interest. However, there is no reason to believe that 
the scales are designed to detect material effects of the determinant on the variable of 
                                                                                                                                                 
America’s agriculture is conducive to small farms, so that more egalitarian institutions emerged. We focus 
on the AJR (2001) measure of settler mortality and latitude and not on agricultural endowments because the 
data on settler mortality and latitude is available for a broader cross-section of countries. 
5 Since we need a categorical variable to do variance decomposition, we use dominant religion dummies 
calculated from the percentage of the population of each religion within each country instead of using the 
percentages directly. 
6 As noted by Alesina et al (2003), ethnic fractionalization has also been found empirically to predict lower 
levels of trust, less efficient public services and less favorable economic outcomes in US localities, 
7 In an earlier version of the paper we used a measure of ethnic fractionalization from Easterly and Levine 
(1997) that Alesina et al (2003) show relies largely on linguistic distinctions.    8
interest or that, if material, the effect is likely to be linear over the range of the scale.
8 We 
discuss these scaling issues in section 5.2.    
  To even the playing field, first we construct a five point scale for both latitude and 
ethnic fractionalization, based on their quintiles, to ensure the same number of categories 
as legal origin and then perform variance component analysis using this five-point scale. 
In the regression, we enter dummies for each unique value of the rescaled variables.  
  Implicit in several of these theories is the prediction that certain classes of firms 
will have their property rights protected better than other types of firms in certain 
countries. Thus, for example, one would expect that in oligarchic societies, large 
incumbent firms would have a greater degree of property rights protection than smaller 
firms. By contrast, the legal origin view, and the culture and ethnic diversity views do not 
imply that the amount of property rights protection should depend more on firm size 
differences in certain countries than in other countries. By considering property rights 
protection at the firm level, we can provide evidence on the likely size of these interactive 
effects.  
In considering the interactions between country effects and firm effects, we 
examine several firm-level characteristics which are associated with different perceptions 
of property rights. Recent studies have shown that the effect of different financial and 
legal systems on firms varies according to the distribution of Firm Size. Differences in 
the effect of institutions across different types firms have also been found. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005, 2006) find that small firms grow more slowly in 
countries with weak financial institutions and firms are larger in countries with well 
developed institutions.  Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002) find that more efficient legal 
systems are associated with larger firm sizes across countries in Western Europe, an 
effect especially pronounced in industries characterized by low levels of capital intensity. 
In a study focused on Mexico, Laeven and Woodruff (2004) find that states with more 
effective legal institutions have larger firms.  
                                                 
8 There is a direct parallel with issues that arise in the testing of asset pricing models such as the CAPM. In 
those tests, theoretically derived constructs such as beta are usually entered directly. However, when 
considering variables such as firm price/earnings ratios, for which there is no direct theoretical justification 
and no presumption of linearity, it is customary to form portfolios of firms with similar values of 
price/earnings ratios (often deciles) and use dummies, or to analyze the deciles separately.    9
Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic (2006) show that incorporated firms 
grow comparatively faster in countries with strong financial and legal institutions than in 
countries with weak institutions. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2005) using the 
same WBES database, find that incorporated and family-owned firms face the highest 
financing obstacles. Thus, we also examine whether firms’ perceptions of property rights 
are affected by their Organizational form and whether there exist interactions between 
organizational forms and the institutional variables. 
There is also an extensive literature documenting a link between ownership 
structure and the institutional environment. LLSV (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000), Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000), and Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) 
show that legal protection of minority shareholders varies across countries, and this 
variation determines the level of ownership concentration, the existence of family firms 
worldwide, the patterns of separation between ownership and management, and the 
degree of expropriation by corporate insiders. The recent spate of privatizations in Latin 
America and the transition economies has also brought the performance of state-owned 
enterprises versus other companies into focus.  La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) 
using the case of Mexican privatizations provide evidence that privately owned firms 
outperform state owned enterprises. Hence, we also investigate to what extent Ownership 
Structure influences firms’ perceptions of how well property rights are protected.  
Beck and Levine (2002) show that differences in legal and financial systems 
affect the availability of external finance and the growth of different industries in the 
manufacturing sector. We would expect these differences to matter as much or more 
when we look across different sectors. Hence, we also examine if belonging to a 







   10
3. Methodology and Data 
  Our analysis relies on the following reduced-form model of property rights 
protection.
9 Let yijk  denote the perceived response of a firm k, belonging to a firm 
category j and located in country i:  
ijk ij j i ijk y ε γ β α µ + + + + =         ( 1 )  
where µ is the average response across all firms and countries, αi are country effects 
(i=1,…, lα),  βj are firm category effects (j=1,….lβ), γij are country-firm interaction effects 
(lγ distinct ij combinations) and the εijk are random disturbances. We look at four different 
categories at the firm level: firm size, ownership, legal organization and industry sector. 
At the country level, apart from the base regression using country dummies, we use four 
other institutional variables to capture the various theories discussed in Section 2. Hence 
we are actually looking at 16 different models (four*four) that are different combinations 
of the firm and country factors. The premise in each estimation is that the model being 
estimated is the true one.  
  The model takes the classification of firms into firm-categories and countries as 
given and is essentially descriptive. In particular, while it posits the existence of 
differences in responses across firms and countries, it offers no causal or structural 
explanation for these differences. Thus, for example, if we find that ethnic diversity 
explains the variation better than legal origin, it leaves open the possibility that ethnic 
fractionalization itself is partially explained by legal origin.
10  
 
3.1 Simultaneous ANOVA  
We analyze this model using a regression based, simultaneous ANOVA approach 
that uses the standard assumptions of ordinary least squares. Equation (1) is a linear 
additive model where the various sets of effects may be highly correlated. To deal with 
this collinearity, the estimation approach reports the incremental explanatory power of 
each set of effects. We begin by estimating a restricted version of equation (1), where we 
                                                 
9 In principle, institutional effects can be non-linear in complex ways, some of which we discuss below. 
However, the comparative finance literature on institutions relies on linear models, and such models are the 
starting point for our analysis. 
10 However, the ultimate “cause” of ethnic fractionalization may not be of direct relevance for firm-level 
analysis since it would be taken as exogenous in such studies.   11
exclude all effects other than the constant and the institutional variable. The R
2 of this 
regression provides an estimate of the proportion of the variation in perceived property 
rights protection at the firm level, explained by the institutional variable alone.  More 
precisely, it provides an upper bound for the amount that can be explained by that 
variable directly and by other variables that the institutional variable predicts. For 
example, assume that large firms report that their property rights are better protected than 
small firms and that the institutional variable under investigation is legal origin. Then a 
regression of property rights protection on legal origin will pick up the direct effects of 
legal origin on firms’ property rights. However, if firms in countries say with French 
legal origin are disproportionately small, then the regression will also pick up an indirect 
effect, arising from the association of French legal origin and the size composition of 
firms.  
  In each case, we next add the firm level characteristic and compute the R
2 to 
obtain an estimate of the proportion of the variation in property rights explained by the 
institutional variable and the firm characteristic together.
11  Finally, we add an interaction 
term, to provide for the possibility that the firm characteristics may affect property rights 
for some values of the institutional variable and not for other values. 
  Our measure of property rights protection has six discrete outcomes, and hence 
a linear model may not be entirely appropriate.  However, as pointed out by Wooldridge 
(2003: p. 553), discreteness of the dependent variable does not in itself mean that linear 
models are inappropriate. Menard (1995) suggests that linear regression (ordinary least 
squares) is reasonable with ordinal dependent variables that have a large number of 
categories by treating the variables as though they were measured on an interval scale
12. 
Since the choice of a non-linear form would be arbitrary we continue to use ordinary least 
squares for our estimation. We do perform robustness tests using a non-linear model 
                                                 
11 Note that the difference in R
2 of the new regression and the restricted regression does not provide an 
estimate of the variation explained by the firm specific variable by itself, but rather the marginal increment 
of explanatory power that is gained by adding the firm specific variable. Thus, if legal origin predicts firm 
size well, the marginal increase in R
2 would be small, even if firm size and property protection are highly 
correlated.  
12 In the sociology and marketing literature, where use of ordinal variables from survey data is ubiquitous, 
it is common practice to treat ordinal variables as being continuous and to use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation when the number of outcomes for the categorical dependent variable is greater than four. The 
assumption behind this is that when the number of cut-off points is greater than four, they may be 
considered to be approximately the same distance from each other.    12
specification and find our results to be unchanged. This is further discussed in section 
5.2.1 of the paper.  
 
3.2 Data 
  We combine firm-level data from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) and country-level variables from a number of different sources. The WBES 
surveyed firm owners and managers on their perception of the business environment in 
the country with questions on judiciary, corruption, regulation, taxation, competition and 
access to financing. The WBES was conducted in 1999-2000 and covers more than 
10,000 firms in 80 countries.   
The limited availability of firm-level data has prompted the increased use of 
surveys in corporate finance. Graham and Harvey (2001) argue that survey-based 
analysis offers a balance between large sample empirical analysis and clinical studies, by 
asking very specific and qualitative questions across a broad section of firms for a 
moderately large sample. The WBES, in particular, has a broad scope in examining more 
than 200 questions in total, covering topics from property rights protection to corruption, 
political instability, financing constraints, regulation, business environment and 
government-business relationships. The survey has a reliable sampling methodology by 
administering the survey on a parallel basis in all the countries using a uniform 
methodology and parallel parameters for sample composition. To ensure uniform 
representation, the sample of firms surveyed was stratified on the basis of several 
variables like sector, size, ownership, exporters and location with the constraint that at 
least 15% of the firms are in each of the sub categories of these variables.  
While there is a great amount of general information available on the firms, the 
identity of the firms and the interviewees is confidential information to encourage correct 
responses from the firms. This prevents us from validating the financial information 
provided by the firms from public records. However, the WBES has been widely used 
and most recently for its firm-level variation by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2005). It has also been used by Transparency International in computing its Corruption   13
Perceptions Index for 2002
13.  After eliminating observations with missing key data
14, our 
sample includes 7760 firms in 80 developed and developing countries.  
We measure property rights protection by survey responses to the question “I am 
confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in 
business disputes”.  Firms are asked to respond on a six point scale, with one denoting 
the highest level of confidence. This property rights question is not meant to capture 
disputes between the state and the individual.  
The four firm-level variables we study, Size, Ownership, Legal Organization, 
and Sector are also obtained from the survey.  The sample includes firms of all sizes: 
small firms (between 5-50 employees) represent 39% of the sample, medium firms (51 to 
500 employees) are 40% of the sample and the remaining 20% are large firms (more than 
500 employees)
15. The firms’ ownership structures are classified into 9 different 
categories - individual, family, conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, 
employees, government and others. We also have information on the legal organization 
of the company, whether it was organized as a single proprietorship, partnership, 
cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange and a 
other category. The firms surveyed belong to five different sectors, agriculture, 
manufacturing, services, construction and other.  
Insert Figure 1 
Figure 1 shows that there are differences in perceptions of property rights across 
firms with different characteristics. Overall, small-sized firms perceive their property 
rights as being less secure when compared to large and medium firms as shown in Figure 
1a. On probing deeper, we find that there is significant variation across sizes even within 
the same country, i.e., holding all legal and political institutions constant. For instance, 
                                                 
13 According to TI, “International surveys on perceptions serve as the most credible means of compiling a 
ranking of nations”. See Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003) for a detailed analysis of the sampling 
methodology and findings of the survey 
14 The original database consists of 10032 observations in 81 countries. We lose 2243 observations because 
of missing data on the dependent variable and the four firm level variables, size, ownership structure, 
organizational form and industry sector. On removing variables with missing institutional variables, we 
lose 1country (West Bank and Gaza) which has 29 firms. This leaves us with 7760 observations in 80 
countries. 
15 Employment is typically the most reliable figure in developing countries. Hence number of full time 
workers is used as a measure of firm size by the World Bank Group and other international survey teams 
including RPED and the Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies   14
medium-sized firms in both Namibia and Nigeria respond most poorly to the property 
rights question when compared to the small and large firms. This is consistent with recent 
work that shows that middle-sized firms in African countries are more severely affected 
than small and large firms (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002)).   
Figure 1b shows the distribution of perceived property rights across firms with 
different types of owners.  Firms owned by workers, followed by individual owned firms, 
have the lowest confidence that their property rights are going to be protected while 
government owned firms respond most positively. At the industry level, firms in 
agriculture and construction sectors have the weakest perception of property rights as 
shown in Figure 1c. When we look at the effect of legal status of the firm on mean 
property rights perception across the 80 countries (Figure 1d), we find that in general, 
incorporated firms perceive property rights protection to be better than firms organized as 
sole proprietorships and cooperatives and more so if they are listed on a stock exchange. 
Insert Table 1 and 2 here 
  Table 1 lists the institutional indicators for the 80 countries in our sample. Panel 
A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and panels B and C examine correlations 
between the variables. The correlations between property rights and legal origin, religion, 
ethnic fractionalization and latitude are all significant at the 1% level as shown in panel B 
of Table 2. The correlations between all the firm level variables and property rights are 
also highly significant at the 1% level indicating that firms of different sizes, industries, 
ownership structures and organizational forms perceive their property rights protection 
differently. The correlations suggest that larger firms and listed corporations perceive 
their property rights to be protected where as firms in agriculture and construction 
industries perceive poor property rights protection. Since the firm level variables are 
categorical variables, the figures 1a to 1d are more informative of the variation in 
property rights across different firm categories. 
 
  4. Empirical Results 
  The results of our analysis of variance on Equation (1) are shown in Table 3. We 
begin with a benchmark specification in which we model institutional variation at the 
country level with a country dummy. This specification provides us with the upper bound   15
for the variation in firm-level responses that can be explained at the country level. In 
alternate specifications, we replace the country dummy with an institutional variable. In 
each case, we calculate the increment to adjusted R-square with effects introduced in the 
following order: country, firm and country-firm interactions. 
Insert Table 3 here 
  Panel A of Table 3 presents the contribution to adjusted R-square when each of 
the institutional variables are entered one at a time. In our sample of 80 countries, country 
dummies explain 17.82% of the variation in firms’ perceptions of how well property 
rights are protected. Table 3 shows that the Law and Finance view
16 holds the dominant 
position in terms of explaining the variation in property rights (3.89%). Latitude explains 
2.24% followed by ethnic fractionalization (1.95%) and religion (1.15%). Legal Origin, 
latitude and ethnic fractionalization both explain more than any firm-level characteristic. 
When entered together, the institutional variables explain about 50% of the total 
explainable variation at the country level (=8.88/17.82).  
  At the firm level, firm size by itself explains 1.07%, ownership structure explains 
1.50%, legal organization explains 0.7% and industry sector explains 0.23%, indicating 
that ownership structure of the company explains the most variation. These numbers 
indicate that in many cases, firm level characteristics are comparable to the country-level 
factors in their explanatory power and sometimes explain more than the institutional 
factors themselves. For instance, ownership structure of the company explains more than 
religion, and explains nearly 39% as much as legal origin and 77% as much as the ethnic 
fractionalization variable.  
  Panel B of Table 3 presents the main results of the variance component analysis 
of Equation (1) using ANOVA. The four sub-panels of panel B of Table 3 correspond to 
four different firm effects being investigated –firm size, industry sector in which the firm 
operates, legal organization of the company and ownership structure of the company. The 
country effects introduced depend on the model being tested. Comparing the firm-level 
effects in each column across panels, we find that ownership structure has the highest 
                                                 
16 Alternative characterizations of legal origin all yield similar results. We experimented with using only 
four dummies-Common law, French civil law, German and Scandinavian civil law and Socialist law, and 
also with using only 3 dummies-Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law. In the former case, the legal 
origin dummies explain 3.77% and in the latter case, they explain 3.70% confirming our result that the Law 
and Finance view explains the most variation in property rights.   16
marginal contribution to adjusted R-squares confirming that ownership structure has the 
greatest explanatory power compared to other firm-level variables
17. 
  For a detailed comparison of the country-firm interactions, we focus on the 
most significant institutional factor – legal origin. Panel A of Table 3 shows that firm size 
by itself explains 1.07% of the variation in property rights. However, when we include 
firm size in a model after legal origin as in panel B, the marginal contribution of firm size 
to adjusted R-squares is only 0.45%. Hence, we conclude that 58% ((1.07-0.45)/1.07) of 
firm size effect is subsumed by legal origin because the size distribution of firms differs 
across countries with different legal origins. Thus, an important indirect channel through 
which legal origin might work is to change the size distribution of firms. Similarly, 17% 
of the industry effect, 83% of legal organization and 70% of the effect due to different 
ownership structures are subsumed within legal origin. So legal origin not only directly 
impacts firms’ perceptions of property rights but also has an indirect impact through its 
effect on the distribution of different types of firms in different countries.   
  When we look at the joint effect of country and firm characteristics, surprisingly, 
the country-firm interactions are largely insignificant and most come in below 1%. 
Therefore for instance, while legal origin subsumes a large part of the size effect, there is 
little evidence that different legal systems affect the property rights perceptions of 
different firms differently. We interpret these results as suggesting that while legal origin 
affects the sizes of firms as they adapt to the institutions, in equilibrium, of the firms that 
exist once they have adapted, we don’t have evidence that different legal origins treat 
firms of different sizes differently. On the other hand, several other institutional factors 
have a moderating effect on the firms. For instance, with respect to ethnic 
fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization subsumes only 2% of the ownership effect and 
6% of the firm organization effect but the interactive effects of ethnic fractionalization 
and ownership (0.77%) and ethnic fractionalization and legal organization (1.19%) are 
not entirely negligible. In fact, the largest interactive effect across all the models is that of 
                                                 
17 For instance, when we look at column IV (Ethnic Fractionalization) of panel B of Table 3, ownership 
structure has the highest marginal contribution to explanatory power (1.47%) compared to any of the other 
firm characteristics.    17
1.19% implying that the extent of ethnic fractionalization of a country affects perceptions 
of firms with different types of legal organization structures differently.
18  
 
5. Robustness Tests  
5.1. Varying the sample size  
  In this section, we investigate the robustness of the Law and Finance view to the 
exclusion of different samples of countries. For one, our sample contains a large number 
of former Socialist economies.
19 These economies are readily classified as having a 
Socialist Legal Tradition by the Legal Origin view in LLSV (1999). However, these 
countries differ from the rest of the countries in the sample by the very fact that they are 
still undergoing shocks of transition and the wholesale restructuring of property rights. 
To the extent that the Socialist Legal Tradition also proxies for common transition 
shocks, the explanatory power of the legal origin view might be overstated in our tests. 
We also investigate the robustness of the results to the exclusion of several outlier 
countries including the African and Low Income countries. Finally we also do several 
random sorts and analyze the results to arrive at a meta conclusion that allows us to 
identify the institutional theory that is most important in explaining property rights 
protection. 
 
5.1.1. Without Former Socialist Economies 
  To investigate if the dominance of the Law and Finance view holds when the 
former Socialist economies are excluded, Table 4 repeats the analysis in Table 3 for a 
smaller sample of 56 non-Socialist economies (and 4588 observations). Country 
dummies now explain only 16.15% of the variation in property rights as compared to 
17.82% previously. The institutional factor that explains the most variation is ethnic 
fractionalization (4.57%) which explains about 28% of the cross-country variation. Both 
                                                 
18 Further investigation reveals that firms organized as cooperatives, in countries with high ethnic 
fractionalization scores, complain most about property rights protection where as incorporated firms in 
these countries respond most favorably.    
19 The transitional economies in our sample are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine. China and Cambodia are also classified as socialist legal tradition and hence are dropped from the 
smaller sample.   18
Legal Origin and Latitude explain 2.16% of the total variation in firms’ responses that 
amounts to about 13% of the cross-country variation although Legal Origin has a more 
significant drop in explanatory power when compared to the full sample of 80 countries 
(-44%) than Latitude (-3.6%).  
Insert Table 4 
  Taken together, all the institutional factors explain approximately 52% of the 
cross-country variation in this reduced sub-sample, while they explained 50% of the 
cross-country variation in the full sample that included the former Socialist countries. 
  At the firm level (not shown in the table), legal organization of the firm 
explains 0.94%
20 which is more than ownership structure (0.44%). Size explains 0.28% 
and there is very little variation explained by the industry sector in which the firm 
operates (-0.03%). When we look at the marginal contribution of the firm effects in Table 
4 (second row in each panel), the variables with the maximum explanatory power across 




5.1.2. Using Settler Mortality 
  Given the strong performance of the latitude variable, we use another measure 
of geographical endowments, Settler Mortality, as stressed by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001). Table 5 shows the results for a sub-set of countries for which data on 
settler mortality is available. The sample is now restricted to 40 countries with 3222 
observations.  This sample of countries is similar to the sample of non-socialist 
economies in Table 4. 
Insert Table 5 here 
  We construct the table using the five point categorization applied to settler 
mortality. The results of Table 5 once again dramatically change the order of explanatory 
                                                 
20 Legal organization is still the dominant firm level variable in smaller sub-samples if we collapse the legal 
organization variable into four categories: sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations and others 
instead of the usual six categories: sole proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, unlisted corporations, 
listed corporations, and others. 
21 The regression coefficients reveal that firms organized as sole proprietorships in countries close to the 
equator are more likely to perceive property rights protection to be poor whereas incorporated firms in 
countries in the fourth quantile of countries (when countries are ranked on their distance from the equator) 
respond most favorably to the question on the extent of property rights protection.   19
power of the various theories established in Table 3. The first row in each panel shows 
that the Law and Finance View is replaced by the Endowments View and Ethnic 
Fractionalization View as the theories with the most explanatory power. Settler Mortality 
now explains the most variation (5.78%) followed by ethnic fractionalization (3.25%). 
Together, the institutional theories explain nearly 62% of all explainable variation at the 
country level. At the firm level, firm size explains 0.54%, firm ownership explains 
0.46%, legal status of the company explains 1.22% and industry sector explains 0.02%
22. 
So once again, in the smaller sub-set of countries, the firm’s legal status explains more 
than ownership structure. The interaction of latitude and legal status of the company has 
the largest explanatory power at 2.04%.
23 
  Tables 3-5 reveal that there is substantial heterogeneity in the explanatory 
power of different institutional factors depending on the sample of countries considered. 
The Law and Finance view figures as the dominant theory when we consider the whole 
sample of 80 countries, but this effect is driven largely by the inclusion of former 
Socialist economies. When we exclude these countries, ethnic fractionalization does well 
in explaining the variation in property rights giving support to the Ethnic Diversity view 
of property rights. The Endowments view also comes out stronger than the Law and 
Finance when we consider a smaller sample of countries for which settler mortality is 
available.  
  Thus, the results suggest that the dominance of the Law and Finance view is 
driven by the inclusion of former socialist economies in the overall sample. While 
previously the focus has been on the role of Common Law versus Civil Law traditions, 
these results show that Legal origin matters mainly because of the extent to which 
transition economies are different from other countries. The poor enforcement of property 
rights in these countries, where institutions in general are in a flux, makes them 
sufficiently different from other countries contributing to the explanatory power of legal 
origin. Once we remove transition economies, the difference between Common and Civil 
                                                 
22 These are individual contributions of the firm level variables not shown in Table 5.  If we were to rescale 
legal organization into four broad categories : Sole Proprietorships, Partnerships, Corporations and Others, 
the rescaled variable explains 0.77% which is still more than size and ownership.  
23 Further investigation of this interactive effect reveals that corporations listed on stock exchanges in 
countries located far away from the equator (countries in the fourth quantile when they are ranked on 
latitude) respond most favorably on the property rights question where as firms organized as cooperatives 
in tropical countries (located close to the equator) perceive property rights protection to be the poorest.   20
Law countries is not significant enough to influence firms’ perceptions of property rights. 
On the other hand, a country’s ethnic fractionalization and natural endowments are a 
strong predictor of property rights in all samples.  
  The implications of the results are less clear cut for the theories themselves. A 
researcher with a strong prior about the importance of legal origins would wish to include 
those countries in the analysis and ascribe their differences from the other countries in the 
sample to differences in legal origin. Such a researcher might conclude that Table 3 
supports his view. A researcher with strong prior beliefs about the importance of ethnic 
and natural endowments differences between transition economies, former colonies and 
West European countries may focus on the samples in Tables 4 and 5, and reach the 
opposite conclusion. 
  At the firm level again, there is significant variation in the contribution of 
different firm characteristics to explaining the variation of property rights. While 
ownership structure of firms is the most significant explanatory variable in the full 
sample, the legal status of the firm explains more variation in property rights than other 
firm-level variables in the smaller sub-samples. The finding that a firm’s organizational 
choice affects the perception of property rights protection it receives is consistent with 
recent evidence in Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic (2006) that organizational 
form of the firm impacts its access to finance and growth. 
 
5.1.3 Random and Non-Random Sorts 
  In this section, we further test the robustness of our finding that the Ethnic 
Fractionalization view is a consistent predictor of Property Rights protection and that the 
Law and Finance view is largely driven by the inclusion of transition economies in the 
sample. In panel A of Table 6, we perform other non-random sorts where we drop 
African economies in column I and all Low Income countries in column II to see if the 
important predictors of property rights differ between developing and developed 
countries. Interestingly, panel A shows that in both cases, Legal Origin has the highest 
explanatory power followed by Latitude
24.  
                                                 
24 Note that the sample without low income countries contains transition economies. Of the 24 transition 
economies in our sample, only Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Uzbekistan are   21
  In columns III and IV of panel B of Table 6, we randomly sample n number of 
countries, where n could be either 56 or 40
25. For each n (say n=56), we perform 500 
trials so that in each trial, the set of 56 countries sampled is different. We then report the 
frequency with which each institutional theory is found to be the most dominant predictor 
of Property Rights. Panel B shows that when we randomly sample 56 countries 500 
times, the variable with the highest probability of explaining the variation in firms’ 
perception of Property Rights is Legal Origin. Legal origin explains the most variation in 
71.4% of the cases compared to Ethnic Fractionalization or Latitude in 12.2% and 17.6% 
of the cases. However, when we randomly sample 40 countries, while Legal origin is still 
the dominant theory it explains the most variation in only 45.6% of the cases.  
  While these results suggest that compared to Religion, Law and Finance and 
Ethnic Fractionalization or Endowment views have the greatest explanatory power, it is 
hard to compare them and isolate the former Socialist economy effect since the sample of 
countries chosen in each trial is random.  Hence in columns V and VI, we perform 
random sampling on the sample of non-transition economies. So out of the 56 non-
transition countries, we randomly sample 40 or 35 countries 500 times each, and 
calculate the frequency with which an institutional theory has the highest explanatory 
power. Ethnic Fractionalization has the highest explanatory power in 72% of the cases 
when we randomly sample 40 countries and in 65% of the cases when we randomly 
sample 35 countries. The results suggest that the Ethnic Fractionalization View has the 
largest predictive power when it comes to explaining the variation in firms’ perceptions 
of property rights in samples of non-transition economies. 
 
5.2 Testing for linearity 
  Previously we argued that there were significant non-linearities in the 
construction of the latitude and ethnic fractionalization variables used to represent the 
endowment and ethnic diversity theories, which questions their use in linear models. To 
even the playing field and ensure that these variables are not at a statistical disadvantage 
                                                                                                                                                 
classified as low income countries. The others are categorized as high income, upper middle income and 
lower middle income countries. 
25 We sample 56 or 40 countries to be consistent with the smaller sample sizes when we drop transition 
economies or countries with missing settler mortality data.    22
in a linear model when compared to legal origin and religion, we constructed a five point 
scale for the variables, based on their quantiles, to ensure the same number of categories 
as legal origin.  In this section we provide further evidence of the non-linearities by 
adding the square and cube of each of the institutional variables to see if it makes a 
difference to the adjusted R-squares of the model. In Table 7 we present results using the 
raw data as well as higher order terms and compare it to the contributions from the 
rescaled variables. The results are shown for the full sample of 80 countries as well as 
smaller sub-samples of non-transition economies and former colonies. The first column 
of Table 7 presents results using raw data (when ethnic fractionalization and latitude are 
not rescaled) for the full sample of countries. We see that Legal Origin explains the most 
variation (3.89%) in firms’ perceptions of property rights protection. In the second 
column we include higher order terms of the institutional variables in the regression 
model. Note that the higher order terms are included only for the continuous variables 
and not for country dummies, legal origin dummies or religion dummies. The ethnic 
diversity and endowment theories increase in explanatory power by as much as 411% and 
94% respectively when we use higher order terms of these variables but Legal Origin still 
dominates. The third column repeats the results from Table 3 where we used rescaled 
values for latitude and ethnic fractionalization. The third column also shows that there is 
a substantial increase in explanatory power of the ethnic fractionalization (by a factor of 
7) and latitude variable (by a factor of 2.2) on rescaling. The table suggests that the 
results in current literature may be biased by ignoring non-linearities present in several of 
the institutional theories.  
Insert Table 7 
  We repeat the above analysis for a sample of 56 non-transition countries and a 
sample of 40 former colonies. In both cases we observe substantial increase in 
explanatory power when we use higher order terms of some institutional variables or 
rescale them. Our results from Tables 4 and 5 that the dominance of Law and Finance 
view is not robust to sample specification are confirmed again. 
 
 
   23
5.2.1. Non-Linear Model Estimation 
In this section we examine whether estimating a non-linear model makes a 
difference to the explanatory power of the different theories. The traditional linear model 
estimated in the tables 3-7 takes the form µ=Xβ, where µ=E(y) with y being the vector of 
observations, X the matrix of covariates and β the vector of regression coefficients.  It is 
assumed that the random effects and the error terms have a distribution which has a 
constant variance independent of the value of the mean of the response variable, y. To 
estimate a non-linear model that recognizes that y is bounded, we have to allow for the 
random effects to enter into the conditional mean in a non-linear fashion, which is 
accomplished by the model in equation (2) below. 
The dependent variable in this study (property rights variable) is an ordered 
response variable with six categories (K=6) representing firms’ perceptions of property 
rights. The model most suited for an ordinal dependent variable such as this is the 
proportional odds model which is a natural extension of the logistic regression model 































l o g         ( 2 )  
where πk is the probability that category j of the response variable is being picked by a 
firm. 
  For the simultaneous ANOVA approach, one point of concern with the logistic 
regression is that the pseudo R-square statistic produced by a logistic regression is no 
longer a good estimate of the explanatory power of the model. However, recent research 
has shown that the McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) R-square analogue is most conducive 
to comparability across different types of empirical models. DeMaris (2002) finds the 
McKelvey and Zavoina R-square to be the best at estimating explained variance in a 
study comparing eight R-square analogues
26.  
                                                 
26 De Maris (2002) distinguishes between the ordered response variable, y being a proxy for an underlying, 
unobserved continuous variable, or latent scale, y* and the response variable y actually representing a 
qualitative change in state with no continuous underlying referent. For the former case (which applies to the 
property rights variable in this study), De Maris recommends that the MZ R-square become the standard 
estimator of explained variance. In fact, he states “The analyst employing MZ-R
2 can therefore be confident   24
When the analysis in Tables 3-6 is repeated using the logistic regression model 
described above, we find that none of the material results are changed. Table 8 presents 
the variance analysis on the re-scaled variables using the MZ R-square statistic.  In the 
full sample with rescaled variables on the basis of the MZ R-square statistic, legal origin 
explains the most variation with 4.3% followed by latitude with 2.3%
27. Religion and 
Ethnic Fractionalization are similar in their explanatory power at 1.2% and 1.8% 
respectively. At the firm level (results not shown), firm size by itself explains 1.1%, 
ownership structure explains 1.7%, legal organization explains 0.8% and industry sector 
explains 0.3%, indicating that ownership structure of the company explains the most 
variation.  
Insert Table 8 
  Thus, consistent with the results in the linear estimation in Table 3, we find that in 
the full sample, Law and Finance view holds the dominant position in terms of explaining 
the variation in property rights. The slight difference between the linear estimation and 
the non-linear analysis in Table 8 arises from the absence of convergence in some models 
when the interactive effects are also included. In the smaller sample of countries too 
(results not shown), we find results consistent with the linear estimation. Ethnic 
Fractionalization (4.8%) and settler mortality (5.9%) replace legal origin (2.4%) as the 
variables with the most explanatory power.  
 
5.3 Other Determinants of Property Rights  
   In addition to the exogenous determinants of property rights discussed above, 
researchers have also shown the importance of other variables for property rights 
protection such as openness to trade and the political system in a country. While these 
variables are comparatively endogenous in that they reflect endogenous factors and hence 
are classified separately, we include them in the robustness section to see which channels 
are most important in influencing property rights protection. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that, at least in large samples, it will, on average be closer to ρ
2 (explained variance) than any of the other 
measures.” 
27 Note that Legal Origin is still the dominant theory when we rescale legal origin into 3 categories: 
Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law Countries instead of the usual 5 categories: Common Law, 
French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist Law. 
   25
  To capture the political view of property rights, we use variables from the Polity 
IV dataset, averaged over the period 1995-99 and Beck et al. (1999)’s Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI). The variables, Democracy and Autocracy, scored from 0-10 
(0 = low; 10 = high) reflect the general openness (closed-ness) of the political institutions 
in the country respectively and are from the Polity IV Dataset
28.  Checks from DPI, 
measures the number of influential veto players in legislative and executive initiatives. 
The political view predicts that greater competition and more checks and balances will 
limit the ability of the elite to dictate policy and institutional development.
 29 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade openness proxies for the extent to 
which certain established interests can restrict entry into their country’s markets. 
According to this view,  one would expect property rights to be better protected in 
countries that are more open to international trade. As a measure of openness of the 
country, we use Trade which is the extent of trade as a percentage of GDP of the 
country. The variable is taken from the World Development Indicators and averaged over 
the period 1995-99. Trade as a percentage of GDP is a potentially endogenous variable 
since a country’s actual openness depends on investor rights. An alternative to this 
variable is the Frankel and Romer (1999) measure of natural openness that is based 
only on geographic characteristics. We present results with both Trade/GDP and the 
Frankel and Romer (1999) measure though the latter is available for only 63 of the 80 
                                                 
28 According to the Polity IV Dataset, the structure of the state is determined by broadly three 
interdependent elements - presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutionalized constraints on 
the exercise of power by the executive and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives 
and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of democracy such as rule of law, freedom of the press 
and so on are regarded as specific manifestations of these general principles. The Democracy indicator is 
derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. Polity IV also has a composite 11 point scale 
for Autocracy since many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these distinct authority patterns. The 
Autocracy score is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief 
executive. 
29 In unreported tables we also used the Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competiveness 
(LIEC/EIEC) from DPI as alternative indices in place of Democracy and Autocracy. LIEC/EIEC are 
narrower measures that focus specifically on the competitiveness of elections, whereas Democracy and 
Autocracy are more general measures of the openness (closedness) of the political system that include 
electoral competitiveness as one aspect. LIEC/EIEC explain a smaller proportion of property rights 
variation than Democracy and Autocracy.   26
countries in the sample. Restricting the sample to non-missing values of the three 
political variables and the Trade/GDP variable leaves us with 75 countries.  
Insert Table 9 
  Column 1 of Table 9 presents results for the sample of 75 countries. As expected, 
the openness to trade and political theories do quite well in explaining the variation in 
property rights protection, with the Democracy variable predicting more variation in 
property rights protection (3.63%) than even the legal origin variable (the second most 
dominant variable at 3.49%). Columns 2 and 3 present results for smaller samples 
excluding former Socialist countries and countries for which data on settler mortality is 
available. In the smaller sub-samples, both the openness to trade and political theories do 
better than the law and finance view. However, the relatively less endogenous Frankel 
and Romer measure of openness to trade, explains less than both ethnic fractionalization 
and legal origin. Overall the results suggest that the ethnic fractionalization theory and 
the endowment view have significant explanatory power when compared to other 
endogenous determinants of property rights protection. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper assesses the contribution of firm and country level factors to firms’ 
perceptions of property rights protection. Using variance decomposition methodology, 
we examine how much of the variation in firms’ perceptions of property rights can be 
attributed to firm characteristics, such as size, ownership structure, industrial sector and 
organizational form, and how much to country level institutional variables. Specifically at 
the country level, we compare the explanatory power of four different theories- Law and 
Finance, Culture, Ethnic Diversity and Endowment view of property rights protection.   
  At the country level, we find that for the full sample of 80 countries, the total 
explainable variation in firms’ perceptions of property rights is capped at 17.82% by the 
use of country dummies. Of this, legal origin accounts for nearly 22% of the total 
explainable variation followed by the endowment view, as proxied by latitude, which 
explains 12% of the total explainable variation.  Together, all the institutional theories 
explain about 50% of the explainable cross-country variation.   27
  However, the dominance of the Law and Finance view in explaining property 
rights variation depends critically on sample selection. Removing the former Socialist 
economies and China or using a smaller sample of countries for which data on settler 
mortality is available, reduces the explanatory power of the Law and Finance view 
significantly.  In a sample of 56 non-Socialist economies, Legal Origin explains around 
13% of the total explainable variation in firms’ perceptions. However in this reduced 
sample, the Ethnic Fractionalization view explains nearly 28% of the total variation in 
firms’ perceptions of property rights.  This is significant because the critical distinction in 
LLSV (1998, 1999) is between Common law and Civil law, not between former Socialist 
and other countries.  It is likely that the Socialist legal origin in our sample proxies for 
country characteristics and problems associated with transition economies that are not 
caused by differences in legal systems that motivate LLSV’s work. 
  Proponents of the ethnic diversity and endowments view argue that ethnic 
fractionalization of the country and its initial endowments shape a country’s institutions. 
The finding that measures of initial endowments and ethnic fractionalization, explain the 
variation of property rights better than specific proxies for institutions, such as legal 
origin, in colonies and samples without former Socialist economies, suggests either that 
there are other unidentified channels by which ethnic fractionalization and endowments 
influence property rights or that the proxies in current use do not measure the underlying 
institutions well. 
  When we compare the firm level factors versus the above discussed institutional 
theories, we find that firm level variables, specifically size, ownership structure and 
organizational form are comparable in their explanatory power to the different theories. 
For instance, in the full sample of 80 countries, comparing the firm variables to country 
dummies, ownership structure explains 8% as much as country dummies, size explains 
6% as much as country dummies and organizational form explains 4% as much as 
country dummies.  
  We also find that the firm level characteristics are in turn endogenously 
determined by the country level factors which decreases their explanatory power when 
put together in a single equation along with country level variables, masking their true 
importance.    28
  The paper shows that scaling of variables matters for the explanatory power of 
different theories. While the matter has been mostly ignored in the finance literature, this 
paper shows that there are significant non-linearities arising from the way some variables 
are scaled, which in turn affects their explanatory power. For instance, on rescaling 
variables like ethnic fractionalization, that represents the Ethnic Diversity View, the 
variable’s contribution to the total variation in firms’ perceptions about property rights 
increases by a factor of seven.   
  Finally this paper provides a new methodology for estimating the importance of 
different country-level and firm-level factors in explaining the variation in property 
rights. The intuitive appeal of this approach lends itself to use in examining other 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The variables are described as follows: Legal Origin takes the value 1 if it is a Common-Law country, 2 if it French civil-law, 3 if it is 
German civil law, 4 if it is Scandinavian law and 5 it is Socialist Law. Religion takes the value 1 if the dominant religious group in the 
country is Catholics, 2 if it is Protestants, 3 if it is Muslims and 4 if the dominant religious group is not Catholics, Protestants or 
Muslim. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic 
group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Detailed variable definitions and 




Origin  Religion Ethnic  Fractionalization Latitude 
Albania 5  4  0.22  0.46 
Argentina 2  1  0.26  0.38 
Armenia 5  4  0.13  0.44 
Azerbaijan 5  3  0.20  0.45 
Bangladesh 1  3  0.05  0.27 
Belarus 5  4  0.32  0.59 
Belize 1  1  0.70  0.19 
Bolivia 2  1  0.74  0.19 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  5  4  0.63  0.49 
Botswana 1  4  0.41  0.24 
Brazil 2  1  0.54  0.11 
Bulgaria 5  4  0.40  0.48 
Cambodia 5  4  0.21  0.14 
Cameroon 2  1  0.86  0.07 
Canada 1  1  0.71  0.67 
Chile 2  1  0.19  0.33 
China 5  4  0.15  0.39 
Colombia 2  1  0.60  0.04 
Costa Rica  2  1  0.24  0.11 
Cote d'Ivoire  2  4  0.82  0.09 
Croatia 5  1  0.37  0.50 
Czech Republic  5  4  0.32  0.55 
Dominican Republic  2  1  0.43  0.21 
Ecuador 2  1  0.66  0.02 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2  3  0.18  0.30 
El Salvador  2  1  0.20  0.15 
Estonia 5  2  0.51  0.66 
Ethiopia 1  4  0.72  0.09 
France 2  1  0.10  0.51 
Georgia 5  4  0.49  0.47 
Germany 3  2  0.17  0.57 
Ghana 1  4  0.67  0.09 
Guatemala 2  1  0.51  0.17 
Haiti 2  1  0.10  0.21 
Honduras 2  1  0.19  0.17 
Hungary 5  1  0.15  0.52 
India 1  4  0.42  0.22 
Indonesia 2  4  0.74  0.06 
Italy 2  1  0.11  0.47 
Kazakhstan 5  4  0.62  0.53 
Kenya 1  4  0.86  0.01 
Kyrgyz Republic  5  3  0.68  0.46 
Lithuania 5  1  0.32  0.62 
Madagascar 2  4  0.88  0.22 
Malawi 1  2  0.67  0.15 
Malaysia 1  3  0.59  0.03 
Mexico 2  1  0.54  0.26   35
Nation 
Legal 
Origin  Religion Ethnic  Fractionalization Latitude 
Moldova 5  4  0.55  0.52 
Namibia 1  2  0.63  0.24 
Nicaragua 2  1  0.48  0.14 
Nigeria 1  4  0.85  0.11 
Pakistan 1  3  0.71  0.33 
Panama 2  1  0.55  0.10 
Peru 2  1  0.66  0.11 
Philippines 2  1  0.24  0.14 
Poland 5  1  0.12  0.58 
Portugal 2  1  0.05  0.44 
Romania 5  4  0.31  0.51 
Russian Federation  5  4  0.25  0.67 
Senegal 2  3  0.69  0.16 
Singapore 1  4  0.39  0.01 
Slovak Republic  5  1  0.25  0.54 
Slovenia 5  1  0.22  0.51 
South Africa  1  4  0.75  0.32 
Spain 2  1  0.42  0.44 
Sweden 4  2  0.06  0.69 
Tanzania 1  3  0.74  0.07 
Thailand 1  4  0.63  0.17 
Trinidad and Tobago  1  4  0.65  0.12 
Tunisia 2  3  0.04  0.38 
Turkey 2  3  0.32  0.43 
Uganda 1  1  0.93  0.01 
Ukraine 5  4  0.47  0.54 
United Kingdom  1  4  0.12  0.60 
United States  1  2  0.49  0.42 
Uruguay 2  1  0.25  0.37 
Uzbekistan 5  3  0.41  0.46 
Venezuela 2  1  0.50  0.09 
Zambia 1  4  0.78  0.17 
Zimbabwe 1  4  0.39  0.22   36
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A presents the summary statistics and Panel B presents the correlations. The variables are described as follows: Property Rights 
is the response of firms to the question “I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in 
business disputes”, scored on a scale of 1-6 (low-high). Firm Size takes on one of three values for small, medium and large firms, 
Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal Organization is one of six values to reflect 
whether the firm is organized as a single proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a 
stock exchange or  another alternative form, and Ownership reflects whether the owner of the firm is an individual, a family, 
conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. Legal Origin takes the value 1 if it is a 
Common-Law country, 2 if it French civil-law, 3 if it is German civil law, 4 if it is Scandinavian law and 5 it is Socialist Law. 
Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant religious group in the country are Catholics, 
Protestants, Muslims or Other, Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not 
from the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Detailed variable 
definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  
 
Panel A: 
Variable N  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent Variables     
Property Rights 7760  3.28 1.42 1.00  6.00
Firm Variables     
Size 7760  1.75 0.74 1.00  3.00
Ownership 7760  3.37 2.18 1.00  9.00
Legal Organization 7760  3.39 1.72 1.00  6.00
Industry 7760  2.11 1.24 1.00  5.00
Institutional Variables     
Legal Origin 7760  3.01 1.72 1.00  5.00
Religion 7760  2.68 1.37 1.00  4.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 7760  0.42 0.23 0.04  0.93
Latitude 7760  0.34 0.21 0.01  0.69
 
 
Panel B:  





Legal Origin  0.18***       
Religion 0.06***  0.18***     
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.05***  -0.44***  0.14***   
Latitude 0.10***  0.66***  0.06***  -0.49*** 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
 
Panel C:  
   Property Rights  Firm Size  Industry Sector 
Legal 
Organization 
Firm Size  -0.10***       
Industry Sector  0.04***  -0.09***     
Legal Organization  -0.08***  0.38***  -0.04***   
Ownership Structure  -0.09***  0.36***  -0.02**  0.39*** 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively   37
Table 3: Determinants of Firms’ Perception of Property Rights Protection  
 
Panel A documents the contribution of the firm level variables and the re-scaled country level variables to the adjusted R-square of the regression model when they are entered one at a time. Panel B 
presents the variance component analysis by including country, firm and interaction effects. The regression model in Panel B is Property Rightsij = Country Effecti + Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or 
Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj) + Country Effecti * Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj). Firm Size takes on one of three values for small, medium and large 
firms, Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal Organization is one of six values to reflect whether the firm is organized as a single proprietorship, 
partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange or  another alternative form, and Ownership reflects whether the owner of the firm is an individual, a family, 
conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. In each regression, the country effect is captured by one of the following variables at the country level: 
Country Dummies, Legal Origin, Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Latitude. The variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different legal 
traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist law, Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant 
religious group in the country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other, Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic 
group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude are rescaled on a five point scale. Dummy variables are used for all 















Panel A: Contribution to Adjusted R-Squares 
Institutional Variables  Property Rights 
Country Dummies  17.82 
Legal Origin Dummies  3.89 
Religion Dummies  1.15 
 Ethnic Fractionalization  1.95 
 Latitude  2.24 
All Institutional Theories Together  8.88 
Firm Variables    
Size Dummies  1.07 
Industry Dummies  0.23 
Legal Organization Dummies  0.7 
Ownership Dummies  1.5 
All Firm Variables Together  2   38
 
Panel B: Country, Firm and Interaction Effects 






Dummy  Legal Origin Dummies  Religion 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization Latitude     
Firm Size                    
Country 17.82  3.89  1.15  1.95  2.24  8.88 
Size 0.33  0.45  0.98  1.04  0.72  0.49 
Interactions 1.06 0.08 0.52  0.74 0.48  1.06 
Total 19.21  4.42  2.65  3.73  3.44  10.43 
Industry                   
Country 17.82  3.89  1.15  1.95  2.24  8.88 
Industrial Sector  0.1  0.19  0.22  0.24  0.13  0.04 
Interactions 0.9  -0.04  0.22  0.23  0.08  0.33 
Total 18.82  4.04  1.59  2.42  2.45  9.25 
Organizational Form                
Country 17.82  3.89  1.15  1.95  2.24  8.88 
Legal Organization  0.33  0.12  0.75  0.66  0.55  0.1 
Interactions 1.33 0.21 0.19  1.19 0.73  1.72 
Total 19.48  4.22  2.09  3.8  3.52  10.7 
Ownership                    
Country 17.82  3.89  1.15  1.95  2.24  8.88 
Ownership 0.32  0.45  1.38  1.47 1.1 0.5 
Interactions 0.67 0.43 0.93  0.77 0.44  1.33 
Total 18.81  4.77  3.46  4.19  3.78  10.71 
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Table 4: Determinants of Firms’ Perception of Property Rights Protection –Without Former Socialist Economies 
This table documents the contribution of each effect to the adjusted R-square of the regression model. The regression model in Panel A(B)(C)(D) is Property Rightsij = Country Effecti + Firm Sizej (or 
Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj) + Country Effecti * Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj). Firm Size takes on one of three values for small, 
medium and large firms, Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal Organization is one of six values to reflect whether the firm is organized as a single 
proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange or  another alternative form, and Ownership reflects whether the owner of the firm is an 
individual, a family, conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. In each regression, the country effect is captured by one of the following variables at the 
country level: Country Dummies, Legal Origin, Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Latitude. The variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different 
legal traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist law, Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant 
religious group in the country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other, Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic 
group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude are rescaled on a five point scale. Dummy variables are used for the 
all the country and firm variables. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  
 
   I. Benchmark   II: Law and Finance  III: Culture   IV: Ethnic Diversity  V: Endowments 
VI: All Institutional 
Theories Together 
   Country Dummy 
Legal Origin 
Dummies  Religion  Ethnic Fractionalization  Latitude    
Panel A: Firm Size                   
Country  16.15  2.16  0.92 4.57 2.16 8.41 
Size  0.14  0.41  0.35 0.38 0.21 0.34 
Interactions  1.11  0.04  0.18 0.58 0.55  1.4 
Total  17.4  2.61  1.45 5.53 2.92  10.15 
Panel B: Industry                   
Country  16.15  2.16  0.92 4.57 2.16 8.41 
Industrial Sector  0.08  0.1  0.1  0.05  -0.04  -0.01 
Interactions  0.45  -0.07  0.13 0.03 0.06  0.2 
Total  16.68  2.19  1.15 4.65 2.18  8.6 
Panel C: Organizational Form                
Country  16.15  2.16  0.92 4.57 2.16 8.41 
Legal  Organization  0.09  0.5  0.71 0.83 0.79 0.25 
Interactions  1.32  -0.14  0.5  0.59 0.93 1.27 
Total  17.56  2.52  2.13 5.99 3.88 9.93 
Panel D: Ownership                
Country  16.15  2.16  0.92 4.57 2.16 8.41 
Ownership 0.2  0.24  0.32  0.63  0.4  0.25 
Interactions  0.64  0.27  0.32 0.26 0.45 0.88 
Total  16.99  2.67  1.56 5.46 3.01 9.54 
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Table 5: Determinants of Firms’ Perception of Property Rights Protection -40 Countries 
This table documents the contribution of each effect to the adjusted R-square of the regression model in a sample of 40 countries for which data on settler mortality is available. The regression model in 
Panel A(B)(C)(D) is Property Rightsij = Country Effecti + Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj) + Country Effecti * Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal 
Organizationj) (or Ownershipj). Firm Size takes on one of three values for small, medium and large firms, Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal 
Organization is one of six values to reflect whether the firm is organized as a single proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange or  another 
alternative form, and Ownership reflects whether the owner of the firm is an individual, a family, conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. In each 
regression, the country effect is captured by one of the following variables at the country level: Country Dummies, Legal Origin,  Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, Settler Mortality, Latitude. The 
variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different legal traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil 
Law and Socialist law. Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant religious group in the country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other. Ethnic 
Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group. Settler Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European 
soldiers in European colonies in the early 19
th century. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Ethnic Fractionalization, Settler Mortality and Latitude 





II: Law and Finance 
View  III: Culture  IV Ethnic Diversity  V: Endowments 
VI: All Institutional Theories 
Together 
   Country Dummy  Legal Origin Dummies  Religion  Ethnic Fractionalization  Settler Mortality  Latitude    
Panel A: Firm Size                 
Country  18.27  2.18 1.34 3.25  5.78  2.08 11.35 
Size  0.09 0.64  0.62  0.46 0.35  0.38 0.36 
Interactions  1.15 0.09  0.13  0.64 0.21  1.11 0.95 
Total  19.51  2.91 2.09 4.35  6.34  3.57  12.66 
Panel B: Industry                   
Country  18.27  2.18 1.34 3.25  5.78  2.08 11.35 
Industrial Sector  -0.05  0.14  0.22  -0.04  -0.05  0  -0.09 
Interactions -0.14  0.04 -0.09 0.09  -0.04  0.32  0.59 
Total 18.08  2.36  1.47  3.3  5.69  2.4  11.85 
Panel C: Organizational Form               
Country  18.27  2.18 1.34 3.25  5.78  2.08 11.35 
Legal  Organization  0.03 0.68  0.93  1.44 0.66  0.74 0.35 
Interactions  1.2  0.22 1.06 1.59  0.5  2.04  2.76 
Total  19.5  3.08 3.33 6.28  6.94  4.86  14.46 
Panel D: Ownership               
Country  18.27  2.18 1.34 3.25  5.78  2.08 11.35 
Ownership  -0.02  0.23 0.28 0.59  0.82  0.39  0.2 
Interactions 0.27  0.72 0.56 0.72  0.3  0.73  0.93 
Total  18.52  3.13 2.18 4.56  6.9  3.2  12.48   41
Table 6: Determinants of Firms’ Perception of Property Rights Protection –Random and Non-Random Sorts 
The regression model estinmated is Property Rightsij = Country Effecti + Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj). Panel A documents the contribution of country level 
and firm level variables to the adjusted R-square of the regression model when entered individually. Panel B presents the frequency with which a particular institutional theory was found to explain the 
most variation in property rights. In Panel B, 500 trials were performed at each of the corresponding sample sizes to determine the frequencies.  Firm Size takes on one of three values for small, medium 
and large firms, Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal Organization is one of six values to reflect whether the firm is organized as a single 
proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange or  another alternative form, and Ownership reflects whether the owner of the firm is an 
individual, a family, conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. In each regression, the country effect is captured by one of the following variables at the 
country level: Country Dummies, Legal Origin, Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Latitude. The variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different 
legal traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist law, Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant 
religious group in the country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic 
group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude are rescaled on a five point scale. Dummy variables are used for the 
all the country and firm variables. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  
 
   Panel A: Contribution to Adjusted R-Squares  Panel B: Frequency with which the institutional theory explains the most variation 
   Non-Random Sorts  Random Sorting on the Full Sample 
Random Sorting on a Sample excluding  
Former Socialist  Countries 
   I II  III  IV  V  VI 
Rescaled Institutional Variables  No African  No Low Income  Sample Size=56  Sample Size=40  Sample Size=40  Sample Size=35 
Country Dummies  17.47  20.05          
Legal Origin Dummies  6.07 8.89  71.4  45.6  13.4 16.6 
Religion Dummies  1.25  2.64  1.4  4.8  1.2  3.2 
(Rescaled) Ethnic Fractionalization  1.64  2.77  12.2  22  71.6 64.8 
(Rescaled) Latitude  2.47  5.5  17.6  31  17.2  18.8 
All Institutional Theories Together  10.38  14.15             
Number of countries  62  55  56  40  40  35 
Number of observations  6463  5472 
Ranges from 4785 to 
5922 
Ranges from 3320 to 
4525 
Ranges from 4174 to 
4986 
Ranges from 2940 
to 3567   42
Table 7: Testing for Linearity 
 
The table documents the contribution of the institutional variables to the adjusted R-square of the regression model when they are entered one at a time and when entered along with the square and cube 
of the variable. Columns I, IV and VII present results using the institutional variable alone in raw data form. Columns II, V and VIII present results using the institutional variable (raw data) as well as 
higher order terms. Columns III, VI and IX present results using rescaled variable dummies. The regression model is Property Rights= Country Effect + Country Effect ^2 + Country Effect ^ 3. The 
variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different legal traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil 
Law and Socialist law. Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant religious group in the country is Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other. Ethnic Fractionalization 
is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country do not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. 
Settler Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19
th century. Columns I-III present results for the full sample of 80 countries, IV-VI 
presents results for 56 countries that do not include former Socialist economies and VII-IX present results for a sample of 40 countries for which data on settler mortality is available. 
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Country  Dummies  17.82  17.82  17.82  16.51  16.51 16.51 18.27 18.27 18.27 
Legal Origin Dummies  3.89  3.89 3.89 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.17 2.17 2.17 
Religion  Dummies  1.15  1.15  1.15  0.92  0.92 0.92 1.34 1.34 1.34 
Ethnic  Fractionalization  0.27  1.38  1.46  3.42   3.05  4.11  
(Rescaled) Ethnic Dummies      1.95      4.57     3.25 
Latitude  1.01 1.96    0.6 0.61  1.58  2.57  
(Rescaled)  Latitude  Dummies      2.24     2.16    2.08 
Settler Mortality           5.8 6.97   
(Rescaled) Setter Mortality Dummies              5.78 
All Institutional Theories Together  7.66  9.09 8.88 5.64 7.63 8.41  10.09  12.32  9.07   43
 Table 8: Determinants of Firms’ Perception of Property Rights Protection –Non Linear Estimation 
 
This table documents the contribution of each effect to the McKelvey and Zavoina(1975) R-square of the logistic regression model. The regression model in Panel A(B)(C)(D) is Property 
Rightsij = Country Effecti + Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj) + Country Effecti * Firm Sizej (or Industry Sectorj) (or Legal Organizationj) (or Ownershipj). Firm 
Size takes on one of three values for small, medium and large firms, Industrial Sector could be agriculture, manufacturing, services, construction or other, Legal Organization is one of six values to 
reflect whether the firm is organized as a single proprietorship, partnership, cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange or  another alternative form, and Ownership 
reflects whether the owner of the firm is an individual, a family, conglomerate group, bank, board of directors, managers, employees, government or other. In each regression, the country effect is 
captured by one of the following variables at the country level: Country Dummies, Legal Origin, Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Latitude. The variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin 
takes one of five possible values for the five different legal traditions: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist law, Religion takes one of four 
different values depending on whether the dominant religious group in the country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other, Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group, Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude are rescaled on 
a five point scale. Dummy variables are used for the all the country and firm variables. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  
 
    I: Benchmark  II: Law and Finance View  III: Culture  IV: Ethnic Diversity  V: Endowments 
   Country Dummy  Legal Origin Dummies  Religion 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization Latitude 
VI: All Institutional 
Theories Together 
  
Panel A: Firm Size                   
Country 19.4  4.3  1.2  1.8 2.3 9.2 
Size 0.3  0.5  1  1.1  0.8  0.5 
Interactions 2.8  0.2  0.8 0.9  0.5  1.4 
Total 22.5  5  3  3.8  3.6  11.1 
Panel B: Industry                   
Country 19.4  4.3  1.2  1.8 2.3 9.2 
Industrial Sector  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.1 
Interactions 25.1  0.1  0.4 0.4  0.3  1 
Total 44.6  4.6  1.9  2.6  2.8  10.3 
Panel C: Organizational Form                
Country 19.4  4.3  1.2  1.8 2.3 9.2 
Legal Organization  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.2 
Interactions .  0.5 0.4  1.4  0.9  2.4 
Total 19.8  5  2.4  4  3.9  11.8 
Panel D: Ownership                   
Country 19.4  4.3  1.2  1.8 2.3 9.2 
Ownership 0.3  0.6  1.5  1.6  1.3  0.6 
Interactions .  0.8 1.3  1.5  0.9  . 
Total 19.7  5.7  4  4.9  4.5  9.8   44
 
Table 9: Other Determinants of Property Rights Protection 
 
Panel A documents the contribution of the firm level variables and the re-scaled country level variables to the adjusted R-square of the regression model when they are entered one at a time. The 
regression model is Property Rights = Country Effect + e. In each regression, the country effect is captured by one of the following variables at the country level: Country Dummies, Legal Origin, 
Latitude, Trade, Checks and Balances, Autocracy and Democracy. The variables are defined as follows: Legal Origin takes one of five possible values for the five different legal traditions: English 
Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist law, Religion takes one of four different values depending on whether the dominant religious group in the 
country are Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or Other, Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group. Latitude is the 
absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Trade is the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP. Frankel-Romer Measure is the trade openness measure based only 
on geographic characteristics from Frankel and Romer (1999). Checks and Balances measures the number of veto-players in the political decision process. Democracy is a measure of the openness of the 
political system while autocracy is a measure of closedness of the political system. Ethnic Fractionalization, Latitude, Trade, Frankel and Romer measure, Checks and Balances, Autocracy and 





Excluding Former Socialist 
Countries 
Excluding Countries with 
Missing Settler Mortality Data 
Institutional Variables  Property Rights 
Country Dummies  16.8  13.91  15.5 
Legal Origin Dummies  3.49  1.4  1.18 
Religion Dummies  1.71  0.87  1.29 
Ethnic 1.88  3.41  2.31 
Latitude 2.18  2.83  4.04 
Settler Mortality      4.74 
 
Openness to Trade Theory 
Trade 1.53  2.01  0.92 
Frankel-Romer Measure  1.49  0.55  0.63 
 
Political Theory 
Checks and Balances  2.02  2.06  1.83 
Democracy  3.63  2.73 3.38 
Autocracy 1.05  0.47  0.34 
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Dependent Variables     
Property Rights 
Scored 1-6, it is an indicator of firm responses to the survey question "I am confident that the judicial system 
will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes". 1 denotes the highest level of confidence 
and 6 denotes the poorest 
World Business Environment Survey 
 
     
Firm Variables     
Firm Size Dummies  A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, medium size if it has between 51 and 500 
employees and large if it has more than 500 employees.  World Business Environment Survey 
Ownership Dummies  Indicates identity of the owner. Nine different categories are identified: Individual, Family, Conglomerate 
group, Bank, Board of directors, Managers, Employees, Government, and Others  World Business Environment Survey 
Industry Dummies  Indicates industrial sector in which the firm operates. Five different categories: Manufacturing, Agriculture, 
Services, Construction, and Other  World Business Environment Survey 
Legal Organization Dummies  Indicates legal status of the company, whether it is organized as a single proprietorship, partnership, 
cooperative, privately-held corporation, corporation listed on a stock exchange and a other category  World Business Environment Survey 
 
     
Institutional Variables     
Legal Origin  An indicator of the type of legal system in the country. It takes the value 1 for English Common law, 2 for 
French Civil Law, 3 for German Civil Law, 4 for Scandinavian Civil Law and 5 for Socialist Law countries 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Religion  An indicator of the dominant religious group in the country. It takes the value 1 for Catholics, 2 for 
Protestants, 3 for Muslims, and 4 for Others 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  Probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Settler Mortality  Log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19th century  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) 
Latitude  Absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between zero and one  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Trade  Share of Imports plus Exports in GDP  World Development Indicators 
Frankel and Romer Measure  Exogenous measure of openness to trade based on geographic characteristics.  Frankel and Romer (1999) 
Checks and Balances  Measure of the number of veto-players in the political decision process, both in the executive and the 
legislature. Average for 1990-95 
Beck, Clark, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh 









An indicator of the general openness of political institutions, scored from 0 (low) to 10 (high). The 11-point 
scale is an additive weighted indicator of the following political variables(weights used are indicated in 
brackets): Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (Election (+2), Transitional (+1)), Openness of 
Executive Recruitment (Dual/Election (+1), Election (+1)), Constraint on Chief Executive (Executive party or 
subordination (+4), Intermediate category (+3), Substantial limitations (+2), Intermediate category (+2)) and 
the Competitiveness of Political Participation (Competitive (+3), Transitional (+2), Factional (+1)). Detailed 
descriptions of the sub-components of the democracy indicator is available from the Polity IV manual. 
Polity IV Dataset 
Autocracy 
An indicator of the general closedness of political institutions, scored from 0 (low) to 10 (high). The 11-point 
scale is an additive weighted indicator of the following political variables (weights used are indicated in 
brackets): Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (Selection (+2)) , Openness of Executive Recruitment 
(Closed (+1), Dual/designation (+1)), Constraint on Chief Executive (Unlimited authority (+3),  Intermediate 
category (+2), Slight to moderate limitations (+1), Regulation of Political Participation (Restricted (+2), 
Sectarian (+1) and the Competitiveness of Political Participation (Repressed (+2), Suppressed (+1)). Detailed 
descriptions of the sub-components of the autocracy indicator is available from the Polity IV manual. 
Polity IV Dataset 
 